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Most states recognize a privilege for journalists to protect confiden-
tial sources from compelled disclosure. The privilege varies from state to 
state, and a major difference is how they define a journalist—i.e., a per-
son qualified to claim the privilege. Some schemes are narrow and limit 
their coverage to employees of professional news organizations. Others 
are broad and cover freelancers, filmmakers, bloggers, and others who 
gather information for publication. But what about student journalists? 
Are they covered? In recent years, as traditional media have adapted to 
changing circumstances, student journalists have played a vital role in 
meeting their communities’ needs for news. This Article explores whether 
state reporter’s privilege protections cover student journalists by review-
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ing existing privilege schemes, ultimately finding that most exclude stu-
dent journalists. This poses a unique problem because, as one commenta-
tor put it, “[i]f we’re going to ask students to fulfill the responsibility of 
being front-line newsgatherers, the least we can do is send them out into 
the field with the confidence of meaningful legal protection.” With that 
in mind, the Article offers solutions and calls for legislative action, ar-
guing that student journalists need more than a paper shield to fulfill 
their editorial responsibilities. This is the first comprehensive scholarly 
analysis of these issues. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The facts of the landmark Supreme Court case Branzburg v. 
Hayes,1 which addressed whether requiring journalists to testify 
before grand juries abridged the First Amendment, are well known 
to media attorneys and legal scholars: Louisville Courier-Journal 
reporter Paul Branzburg observed two young people make and use 
marijuana and hashish, and wrote news articles about his expe-
rience and local drug use generally.2 He promised confidentiality to 
his sources and later refused to reveal their identities before a state 
grand jury.3 Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to grant 
Branzburg—or any other reporter—a First Amendment-based pri-
vilege to refuse to testify under those circumstances.4 However, 
the concurring and dissenting opinions laid the foundation for such 
a privilege and outlined how it would work5 in language that has 
found its way into numerous statutes, court decisions, and proce-
dural rules—all potential bases today for a reporter to claim a privi-
lege from being compelled to testify about, or otherwise produce, 
their confidential sources or information.6 
                                                                                                                            
1 408 U.S. 665 (1972). In the companion cases of In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 297 (Mass. 
1971), and Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), which were 
consolidated into Branzburg v. Hayes, two other reporters, each covering the Black 
Panther organization, were subpoenaed to testify before grand juries and reveal 
information that they had received in confidence. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 672–73, 675. 
Like Branzburg, the reporters refused. Id. 
2 Id. at 667–68. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 667 (“The issue in these cases is whether requiring newsmen to appear and 
testify before state or federal grand juries abridges the freedom of speech and press 
guaranteed by the First Amendment. We hold that it does not.”). 
5 Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
6 Jonathan Peters, Shield Laws and Journalist’s Privilege: The Basics Every Reporter 
Should Know, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Aug. 22, 2016), http://www.cjr.org/united_ 
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But what if Paul Branzburg, instead of working as a full-time 
professional journalist for an established newspaper, was a seven-
teen-year-old student journalist working today for the East High 
Courier? Imagine he reports a story about teacher misconduct that 
lands him before a state grand jury, where he is ordered to reveal 
his confidential sources. Would he have to comply? Or what if 
Branzburg was a college sophomore writing his first piece for the 
Daily Collegian? Imagine that he reports that a high-ranking admin-
istrator once embezzled funds, and the paper receives a subpoena 
from state prosecutors to obtain his unpublished notes. Would he 
have to provide them? In either case, could Branzburg as a student 
journalist reasonably expect to be protected by a state reporter’s 
privilege? Probably not. 
While the majority of states offer some protections for journal-
ists to shield their confidential sources, the protections usually do 
not extend to student journalists—either because the students do 
not qualify for them, or the qualifying criteria are so unclear that 
student journalists could not reasonably expect to be covered.7 
This is problematic because of the importance of student journal-
ists’ work. The gathering, production, and dissemination of news is 
increasingly dispersed,8 and as traditional outlets have adapted to 
changing circumstances and challenging economics, student jour-
                                                                                                                            
states_project/journalists_privilege_shield_law_primer.php [https://perma.cc/B8R8-
M5AG]. 
7 See infra Section II.A. 
8 See Leonard Downie, Jr. & Michael Schudson, The Reconstruction of American 
Journalism, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Nov./Dec. 2009), http://archives.cjr.org/ 
reconstruction/the_reconstruction_of_american.php [https://perma.cc/2S23-3D7F] 
(“[T]he economic foundation of the nation’s newspapers, long supported by advertising, 
is collapsing, and newspapers themselves, which have been the country’s chief source of 
independent reporting, are shrinking . . . . Commercial television news, which was long 
the chief rival of printed newspapers, has also been losing its audience, its advertising 
revenue, and its reporting resources. Newspapers and television news are not going to 
vanish in the foreseeable future, despite frequent predictions of their imminent 
extinction. But they will play diminished roles in an emerging and still rapidly changing 
world of digital journalism, in which the means of news reporting are being re-invented, 
the character of news is being reconstructed, and reporting is being distributed across a 
greater number and variety of news organizations, new and old.”). 
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nalists have played a vital role in meeting their communities’ needs 
for news and information.9 
For example, student journalists in Kansas recently published 
an investigative story showing that their newly hired principal 
lacked the credentials she claimed to have: “[The students] called 
government offices, dredged databases, interviewed people, and 
conducted international conference calls—all while some district 
officials . . . stood by the principal.”10 But eventually the principal 
resigned, and professional journalists worldwide praised the stu-
dents’ reporting.11 Two years ago, in New Jersey, student journal-
ists brought to light misconduct complaints against a superinten-
dent.12 And at Northwestern University, undergraduate journalism 
students produced a series of reports that led to the exoneration of 
seven Illinois prisoners, three of whom were under death sen-
tences.13 As Frank LoMonte, executive director of the Student 
Press Law Center, a nonprofit based in Washington, D.C., put it: 
“If [we are] going to ask students to fulfill the responsibility of be-
ing front-line newsgatherers, . . . the least we can do is send them 
out into the field with the confidence of meaningful legal protec-
tion.”14 
With that in mind, this Article explores whether and how state 
reporter’s privilege protections cover student journalists, focusing 
on three typical sources of the privilege: statutes, constitutions, and 
                                                                                                                            
9 Jonathan Peters & Frank LoMonte, College Journalists Need Free Speech More than 
Ever, ATLANTIC (Mar. 1, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/03/ 
college-journalists-need-free-speech-more-than-ever/273634 [https://perma.cc/K568-
BDQN]. 
10 Jonathan Peters, How Kansas High School Journalists Exposed a Principal’s Puffed-up 
Resume, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Apr. 6, 2017), http://www.cjr.org/united_states_ 
project/kansas_high_school_newspaper.php [https://perma.cc/7MVF-EFKT]. 
11 Id. 
12 SPLC Case File: High School Reporter’s Investigative Article Was Censored for Three 
Months for Using Anonymous Sources, STUDENT PRESS L. CTR. (Dec. 23, 2015, 4:44 PM), 
http://www.splc.org/article/2015/12/splc-case-files-northern-highlands-regional-high-
school [https://perma.cc/EA3C-YT8Y]. 
13 Rob Warden, The Revolutionary Role of Journalism in Identifying and Rectifying 
Wrongful Convictions, 70 UMKC L. REV. 803, 845 (2002). 
14 Jonathan Peters, How a New Campaign Is Trying to Strengthen the Rights of Student 
Journalists, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Feb. 19, 2016), http://www.cjr.org/united_ 
states_project/new_voices_campaign.php [https://perma.cc/VQM5-NT9K]. 
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the common law. Part I explains the theoretical basis for recogniz-
ing a reporter’s privilege, and discusses both Branzburg and its 
progeny, which offer useful background information for under-
standing the context in which state protections have developed. 
Part I also reviews the scholarly literature on state reporter’s privi-
lege protections. Part II analyzes the state protections and consid-
ers how they apply to student journalists. It analyzes statutes, cases 
interpreting statutes, cases interpreting constitutional provisions, 
and the common law. Part III concludes with comments on the 
growing and ever-important population of student journalists and 
the need to enhance their privilege protections. It offers some solu-
tions, and it calls for legislative action. This is the first comprehen-
sive scholarly analysis of these issues. 
I. THE BASICS OF A REPORTER’S PRIVILEGE 
Any person ordered to testify at a legal proceeding is generally 
required to comply.15 If the person refuses, he or she may be sub-
ject to a judicial finding of contempt.16 There are, however, excep-
tions called privileges.17 The best known is probably the attorney-
client privilege, which exempts attorneys from testifying about 
their confidential communications with clients.18 Many states rec-
ognize similar privileges for medical doctors, psychological therap-
ists, religious advisors, and spouses.19 These privileges are all based 
                                                                                                                            
15 See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991) (stating that the First 
Amendment does not “relieve a newspaper reporter of the obligation shared by all 
citizens to respond to a grand jury subpoena and answer questions relevant to a criminal 
investigation”); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690–91 (1972) (finding that “the 
public interest in law enforcement and in ensuring effective grand jury proceedings” 
outweighs the burden on news gathering); United States v. Sterling, 724 F.3d 482, 493 
(4th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he Branzburg Court declined to treat reporters differently from all 
other citizens who are compelled to give evidence of criminal activity . . . .”). 
16 See FED. R. CIV. P. 45(g); FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(g). 
17 See generally Privilege, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
18 See id.; see also Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (“The 
attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications 
known to the common law.”). 
19 See Privilege, supra note 17. 
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on the belief that there is a public interest justifying the exclusion 
of testimony.20 
In all but one state, journalists may claim a privilege of some 
kind to protect themselves from legal efforts to compel their testi-
mony about confidential sources or information.21 The privilege’s 
rationale is that journalists rely on sources to provide the informa-
tion they publish, and some sources will not share sensitive infor-
mation without a promise of anonymity. Consider what Time mag-
azine’s Matthew Cooper wrote in a July 2005 affidavit, filed in a 
privilege dispute: 
I could not effectively report on matters of concern 
to the public—war, peace, the budget—without us-
ing confidential sources; nor could any of my col-
leagues at Time magazine. Many newsworthy stories 
come to me from people—some connected with the 
Administration, some not—who make it clear to me 
that they will not offer the information to me unless 
I can promise them that their identities will remain 
secret. This is widely understood to be the case not 
just for myself but for journalists at all major publi-
cations . . . . By promising confidentiality to [those 
sources who demand it], I am able to report on 
many things that would otherwise go unreported.22 
The reporter’s privilege, then, recognizes that there is a public 
interest in encouraging the disclosure of newsworthy information. 
It also recognizes that the press’s credibility depends on its actual 
and perceived independence.23 As one of the authors of this Article 
                                                                                                                            
20 See, e.g., Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (“[The] purpose [of the attorney-client privilege] is 
to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and 
thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of 
justice.”). 
21 See infra Part II. 
22 Brief of Appellants Judith Miller, Matthew Cooper and Time Inc. at 15, In re Grand 
Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Nos. 04-3138, 04-3139, 04-
3140) (quoting affidavit of Matthew Cooper). 
23 Cathy Packer, Confidential Sources and Information, in COMMUNICATION AND THE 
LAW 321, 325 (W. Wat Hopkins ed., 2009) (“When police and prosecutors rely on 
journalists for information, they make the media an arm of law enforcement, although that 
770         FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVII:763 
 
previously noted: “If journalists are, or are seen as, investigative 
arms of the government or private interests, . . . the public might 
lose faith in their reporting and be loath to trust them with informa-
tion.”24 
Privileges, which vary from one state to the next, are found in 
multiple sources. Lower courts have invoked Branzburg to recog-
nize a qualified First Amendment-based privilege,25 but there is 
currently no analogous federal shield statute.26 At the state level, 
depending on the jurisdiction, journalists can claim the privilege 
under a state statute27 or a state’s common law28 or under the state 
or federal constitution.29 The scope of their protections varies, so it 
is necessary to assess several issues to determine whether a privi-
lege will protect a journalist in a particular case.30 
Some state privileges, for example, protect only confidential 
sources and information,31 while others protect information regard-
less of its confidentiality.32 Many privileges are subject to excep-
tions or balancing tests that enable the party compelling disclosure 
to overcome the privilege in limited circumstances (say, in criminal 
cases where the offense is punishable by life imprisonment and the 
information sought is essential to the proceeding).33 And, most im-
portantly for this Article, the threshold question in a privilege claim 
                                                                                                                            
is not their proper role in a democracy and undermines their credibility with sources. 
Journalists are supposed to be watchdogs of law enforcement.”). 
24 Peters, supra note 6. 
25 See, e.g., United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1504 (11th Cir. 1986); LaRouche 
v. Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc., 780 F.2d 1134, 1139 (4th Cir. 1986); Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 
705, 710–11 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 
583, 595–99 (1st Cir. 1980); Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 725 (5th 
Cir. 1980); Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 715 (3d Cir. 1979); Silkwood v. Kerr-
McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 438 (10th Cir. 1977). 
26 RonNell Andersen Jones, Avalanche or Undue Alarm? An Empirical Study of 
Subpoenas Received by the News Media, 93 MINN. L. REV. 585, 586 (2008) (“For more than 
thirty years, a legislative battle has raged over the need for a federal shield law for 
journalists.”). 
27 See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 885.14 (2016). 
28 See, e.g., Sinnott v. Bos. Ret. Bd., 524 N.E.2d 100 (Mass. 1988). 
29 See, e.g., In re Wright, 700 P.2d 40, 41 (Idaho 1985). 
30 Peters, supra note 6. 
31 See, e.g., 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-19.1-1 to 9-19.1-3 (2016). 
32 See, e.g., D.C. CODE §§ 16-4701–16-4704 (2016). 
33 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 767.5a (2016). 
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is whether the privilege applies to the claimant. In other words: Is 
the person a journalist as defined by the privilege’s source? Some 
schemes are narrow and cover employees of traditional news or-
ganizations,34 while others are broad and extend to bloggers, re-
searchers, freelancers, filmmakers, and book authors.35 But what 
about student journalists? 
A. Few More Words About Branzburg 
Branzburg and its progeny offer useful background information 
to understand the context in which state reporter’s privileges have 
developed. Branzburg consolidated the cases In re Pappas and Unit-
ed States v. Caldwell, in which prosecutors subpoenaed two differ-
ent reporters covering the Black Panther Party.36 The prosecutors 
charged party leaders with various crimes and wanted the reporters 
to testify before grand juries about party activities. The reporters, 
Paul Pappas and Earl Caldwell, refused to testify.37 They argued 
that the First Amendment protected them from compelled disclo-
sure of their sources’ identities, asserting that if they were forced 
to disclose, then all sources would be reluctant to speak to report-
ers, and the free flow of information would suffer as a result.38 
The Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision written by Jus-
tice Byron White, ruled that a journalist has the same duty as all 
other citizens to testify when called upon.39 However, Justice Lew-
is F. Powell, the fifth vote to reject the privilege based on Branz-
burg’s facts, refused to go that far.40 In a concurring opinion, he left 
open the possibility that the First Amendment might protect a re-
porter under other circumstances: 
The asserted claim to privilege should be judged on 
its facts by the striking of a proper balance between 
freedom of the press and the obligation of all citi-
                                                                                                                            
34 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.275 (2015). 
35 See, e.g., In re Jan. 11, 2013 Subpoena by Grand Jury of Union Cty., 75 A.3d 1260, 
1271 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2013). 
36 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 672–77 (1972). 
37 Id. at 672–73, 675. 
38 Id. at 679–80. 
39 Id. at 690–91. 
40 Id. at 709–10 (Powell, J., concurring). 
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zens to give relevant testimony with respect to crim-
inal conduct. The balance of these vital constitu-
tional and societal interests on a case-by-case basis 
accords with the tried and traditional way of adjudi-
cating such questions. In short, the courts will be 
available to newsmen under circumstances where 
legitimate First Amendment interests require pro-
tection.41 
Justice Potter Stewart, in dissent, expanded on those ideas and 
explained how a reporter’s privilege would work, reasoning that a 
reporter’s right to a confidential relationship with his source stems 
“from the broad societal interest in a full and free flow of informa-
tion to the public.”42 He added that “the right to publish is central 
to the First Amendment and basic to the existence of constitutional 
democracy,” concluding that the “corollary of the right to publish 
must be the right to gather news.”43 Justice Stewart also outlined 
three criteria the government must satisfy to subpoena a reporter: 
The government must demonstrate that (1) “the information 
sought is clearly relevant to a precisely defined subject of govern-
mental inquiry,” (2) “it is reasonable to think the witness in ques-
tion has that information,” and (3) “there is not any means of ob-
taining the information less destructive of First Amendment liber-
ties.”44 
By reading Justice Powell’s concurrence as a check on the ma-
jority, and by mining Justice Stewart’s dissent for guidance to ap-
ply the privilege, lower courts have relied on Branzburg’s fractured 
opinions to recognize a qualified First Amendment-based privi-
lege.45 But courts have struggled to resolve the key issue of who 
                                                                                                                            
41 Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). 
42 Id. at 725–26 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
43 Id. at 727. 
44 Id. at 740 (citations omitted). 
45 See Stephen Bates, Overruling a Higher Court: The Goodale Gambit and Branzburg v. 
Hayes, 14 NEXUS 17, 18 (2009) (“No longer did Branzburg reject a reporter’s privilege; it 
created one. Lower courts generally cited the Powell concurring opinion for the 
proposition that reporters are entitled to some sort of privilege, and then applied the test 
from the Stewart dissent.”); see also Sonja R. West, Concurring in Part & Concurring in the 
Confusion, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1951, 1951–52 (2006). 
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qualifies as a journalist.46 Notably, this struggle was predicted by 
the Branzburg majority, which stated: 
The administration of a constitutional newsman’s 
privilege would present practical and conceptual dif-
ficulties of a high order. Sooner or later, it would be 
necessary to define those categories of newsmen 
who qualified for the privilege, a questionable pro-
cedure in light of the traditional doctrine that liberty 
of the press is the right of the lonely pamphleteer 
who uses carbon paper or a mimeograph just as 
much as of the large metropolitan publisher who uti-
lizes the latest photocomposition methods.47 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in the case In 
re Madden, engaged in this type of “questionable procedure,” es-
tablishing a multi-part test that requires anyone asserting the privi-
lege to satisfy three elements.48 The court held that “individuals 
are journalists when engaged in investigative reporting, gathering 
news, and have the intent at the beginning of the news-gathering 
process to disseminate this information to the public.”49 Thus, the 
test requires courts to define “two equally complex concepts: in-
vestigative reporting and news,”50 both of which the Third Circuit 
failed to define.51 
                                                                                                                            
46 William E. Lee, The Priestly Class: Reflections on a Journalist’s Privilege, 23 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 635, 663 (2006). Other issues include: whether protection should 
extend only to a source’s identity or also to unpublished information; whether the 
privilege protects a reporter’s notes, outtakes, and similar unpublished materials; whether 
the privilege protects information possessed by third parties, like telephone companies; 
whether procedural mechanisms should be in place for asserting or overcoming the 
privilege; and whether the source may waive the privilege. Id. 
47 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 703–04. 
48 151 F.3d 125, 128–30 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 703–04). 
49 Id. at 130. Professor Clay Calvert summarized the test as follows: “(1) the claimant 
was engaged in investigative reporting; (2) the claimant was gathering news; and (3) the 
claimant possessed the intent at the inception of the newsgathering process to 
disseminate the news to the public.” Clay Calvert, And You Call Yourself a Journalist?: 
Wrestling with a Definition of “Journalist” in the Law, 103 DICK. L. REV. 411, 426 (1999). 
50 Calvert, supra note 49, at 426. 
51 In re Madden, 151 F.3d at 130. 
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Two other circuits have taken similar approaches. In von Bulow 
v. von Bulow, the Second Circuit held that “the individual claiming 
the privilege must demonstrate, through competent evidence, the 
intent to use material—sought, gathered or received—to dissemi-
nate information to the public and that such intent existed at the 
inception of the newsgathering process.”52 The court further noted 
that the person invoking the privilege need not be a member of the 
“institutionalized press,” as long as she is engaged in “activities 
traditionally associated with the gathering and dissemination of 
news.”53 In Shoen v. Shoen, the Ninth Circuit found the Second 
Circuit’s reasoning in von Bulow to be persuasive, stating that a 
“journalist’s privilege is designed to protect investigative report-
ing.”54 The court focused on the activities of the person invoking 
the privilege, explaining that “what makes journalism journalism is 
not its format but its content.”55 Thus, the court concluded that 
the privilege protects information gathered in pursuit of news, but 
it did not define what constitutes news.56 Instead, the court simply 
acknowledged the importance of “bringing to light ‘newsworthy’ 
facts on topical and controversial matters of great public impor-
tance.”57 
These leading cases define a journalist by way of journalism, 
and set forth four general principles: (1) the medium does not de-
termine whether the claimant is a journalist; (2) the claimant’s in-
tent is important, because he/she must seek to disseminate infor-
mation to the public; (3) the claimant’s activities are important, too, 
because he/she must be engaged in investigative reporting; and (4) 
the content disseminated must be news.58 The third and fourth 
principles raise additional questions: What is investigative report-
ing, and what is news? No post-Branzburg court has answered 
these questions fully, but relevant cases adopt the view that inves-
tigative reporting involves people who conduct interviews, analyze 
                                                                                                                            
52 811 F.2d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 1987). 
53 Id. at 142. 
54 5 F.3d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1993). 
55 Id. (emphasis added). 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Calvert, supra note 49, at 430–31 (emphasis added). 
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information, and make recommendations; and news involves the 
corresponding use of quotes, analysis, and recommendations.59 
B. Scholarly Literature on State Shield Privileges 
This review focuses on recent scholarly works on state statuto-
ry, constitutional, and common-law reporter’s privilege protec-
tions. To begin, some commentators have focused on the value or 
quality of speech to determine if it should be protected. Media law 
professors Jason Martin and Anthony Fargo, along with media law-
yer Mark Caramanica, expressed concern in 2011 over news organ-
izations that use state shield laws to protect anonymous commen-
ters’ speech at the expense of potentially defamed or injured plain-
tiffs.60 The authors urged news organizations to exercise restraint 
when defending anonymous commenters who post on their web-
sites,61 advising the organizations to assess the value of commen-
ters’ speech and adjust their defenses accordingly.62 The authors 
noted that states could alleviate plaintiffs’ concerns by amending 
their shield laws to narrow the scope of their protections, though it 
is rare for states to do so.63 More commonly, states amend their 
shields to provide more protections; Maryland’s statute, which now 
explicitly includes college journalists, is a prime example.64 
Opinions vary on whether reporter’s privileges should be ex-
pansively or narrowly drafted—and whether they should be recog-
nized at all. Brad A. Greenberg, a visting fellow at Yale Law 
School,65 warned that support for a federal shield law could ignore 
                                                                                                                            
59 Jonathan Peters & Edson C. Tandoc, Jr., “People Who Aren’t Really Reporters at All, 
Who Have No Professional Qualifications”: Defining a Journalist and Deciding Who May 
Claim the Privileges, 2013 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y QUORUM 34, 49. 
60 See Jason A. Martin, Mark R. Caramanica & Anthony L. Fargo, Anonymous Speakers 
and Confidential Sources: Using Shield Laws When They Overlap Online, 16 COMM. L. & 
POL’Y 89 (2011). 
61 Id. at 125. 
62 Id. at 123–24 (“[C]ourts in anonymous comment cases have already differentiated 
between ‘higher value’ and ‘lower value’ speech, mostly in the context of anonymity 
being used to conceal copyright violators, persons making threats, or persons engaged in 
commercial speech.”). 
63 Id. at 119–20. 
64 Id. at 119; see infra Section II.A. 
65 Brad Greenberg, YALE LAW SCHOOL, https://law.yale.edu/brad-greenberg 
[https://perma.cc/AL8T-VYHP] (last visited Apr. 26, 2017). 
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greater threats to the independent judiciary.66 He pointed out that 
shield laws are not a panacea: “Press advocates should not simply 
see some shield as superior to no shield. If a shield law is to ensure 
the free flow of information to the public, it must account for the 
costs and benefits of what is covered and what is not.”67 
Other commentators have focused on model shield laws, with 
one calling Branzburg “a model of muddle”68 and proposing a state 
statute that represents a sort of blended approach: absolute protec-
tion for sources and qualified protection for information, subject to 
a test not unlike the one outlined in Justice Stewart’s dissent.69 
That commentator also used student-friendly language to define 
journalists70—an issue this Article discusses later.71 
Another commentator asserted that bloggers should have their 
own shield laws based on the theory that bloggers work within a 
horizontal (peer-to-peer) editorial scheme, while full-time profes-
sional journalists work within a vertical (editor-to-reporter) 
scheme.72 “Courts might best promote the free flow of informa-
                                                                                                                            
66 Brad A. Greenberg, The Federal Media Shield Law Folly, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 437 
(2013). 
67 Id at 451. Greenberg added that it might be more advantageous to journalists to limit 
the third-party doctrine, which arose in the context of telephony and is agnostic as to the 
content: “This [doctrine] poses a problem for the free flow of information because 
sources have no guarantee that a reporter can keep their identity secret. In fact, a reporter 
attributing leaked information to an anonymous source invites government investigators 
to execute a search warrant on that report’s phone logs.” Id. at 449. 
68 Joshua A. Faucette, Note, Your Secret’s Safe with Me . . . Or So You Think: How the 
States Have Cashed in on Branzburg’s “Blank Check,” 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 183, 197 (2009) 
(“Overall, Branzburg and its ‘blank check’ to the states have been nothing more than a 
model of muddle because the decision failed to give the states any guidance as to what 
type of privilege a reporter’s shield law should grant to newsgatherers.”). 
69 However, Faucette’s proposal suggested a lower standard for Justice Stewart’s third 
prong—the need for information should be “reasonable,” rather than “compelling and 
overriding.” Id. at 232. 
70 Id. at 230 (“Any person associated, employed, or regularly engaged, connected or 
affiliated for personal, pecuniary, or financial gain with a newspaper or media organization 
that publishes or broadcasts at regular intervals or has a general circulation shall fall under 
the protection of this Act.”). 
71 See infra Part II. 
72 Benjamin J. Wischnowski, Note, Bloggers with Shields: Reconciling the Blogosphere’s 
Intrinsic Editorial Process with Traditional Concepts of Media Accountability, 97 IOWA L. REV. 
327, 330–31 (2011). 
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tion,” he argued, “by distinguishing the different forms of inves-
tigative journalism as a definitional matter and judging them accor-
dingly.”73 He warned that ignoring the technical nuances between 
bloggers and full-time professional journalists would create the risk 
of judicial overprotection for bloggers by granting all-encompassing 
reporter protections to bloggers who perform only informational, 
as opposed to investigative, functions.74 
Several commentators have suggested drafting narrower shield 
statutes in the hope of allaying legislative concerns. One stressed, 
for example, that a federal shield bill would not pass if it defined 
journalists broadly, pointing out that earlier versions failed because 
of politicians’ fears of the difficulty of defining a journalist.75 He 
argued: “[T]he traditional press is most in need of statutory pro-
tections, and it would be unwise to burden the bill with provisions 
that protect persons beyond this group.”76 He added that “clear 
lines must separate journalists from amateur writers,”77 a philoso-
phy that would exclude bloggers, non-traditional reporters, and 
student journalists. 
To a significant degree, that kind of narrowness is already a re-
ality. After analyzing various state shield statutes, media law pro-
fessors Erik Ugland and Jennifer Henderson concluded that the 
statutes and their judicial interpretations “reflect[] . . . an expert 
conception of the press.”78 It is evident in statutory and judicial 
references to money and employment, meaning the claimaint must 
demonstrate that he or she is employed as a journalist or earns 
                                                                                                                            
73 Id. at 341–42. 
74 Id. at 343; see also Jill Laptosky, Protecting the Cloak and Dagger with an Illusory Shield: 
How the Proposed Free Flow of Information Act Falls Short, 62 FED. COMM. L. J. 402, 434 
(2010) (suggesting that the Free Flow of Information Act should provide for the balancing 
of competing interests, such as protecting the free flow of information versus compelling 
disclosure in a court setting). 
75 Scott Neinas, Comment, A Skinny Shield Is Better: Why Congress Should Propose a 
Federal Reporters’ Shield Statute That Narrowly Defines Journalists, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 
225, 238 (2008). 
76 Id. at 226. 
77 Id. at 238. 
78 Erik Ugland & Jennifer Henderson, Who Is a Journalist and Why Does It Matter? 
Disentangling the Legal and Ethical Arguments, 22 J. MASS MEDIA ETHICS 241, 248 (2007). 
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money doing journalism.79 Meanwhile, media law professor Jona-
than Peters (one of the authors of this Article) and Edson Tandoc, 
a media scholar in Singapore, found that a major part of being a 
journalist is a social role: serving the public welfare by reporting on 
issues and events central to society’s well-being in matters of 
health, safety, economics, and politics.80 They wrote: 
From contributors to CNN iReport . . . to reporters 
at the New York Times, all are capable of gathering, 
processing, and disseminating news and information 
to serve the public interest. Some do it better than 
others, some have more resources than others, and 
something is gained when reporting is done by sta-
ble organizations with money, logistics, and legal 
services—but all are capable.81 
For these reasons, they said “an elitist conception of a journal-
ist” that focuses on income or employment would offend the spirit 
of the First Amendment, “which protects both the institutional 
press and the lonely pamphleteer.”82 But Martin and Fargo, noted 
above, call for a narrow definition, arguing: 
Whether it is better, for bloggers and other non-
traditional journalists, that a statute is vague or spe-
cific in defining who is covered by the law is not as 
clear as one would think. While it would seem logi-
cal to assume that specificity is a commendable trait 
in a statute, that may not always be the case with 
press shield laws . . . . [B]ecause the journalist’s pri-
vilege, or any other privilege for that matter, limits 
the testimony that might be obtained in a court of 
law or similar proceedings, the privilege should be 
narrowly interpreted. Statutes that specify which 
media or persons may invoke the privilege may in-
                                                                                                                            
79 Id. at 248–51. 
80 Peters & Tandoc, supra note 59, at 61. 
81 Id. at 61–62. 
82 Id. at 61. 
2017] A PAPER SHIELD? 779 
 
advertently deny the privilege to persons or media 
not named in the law. 83 
As courts consider the privilege’s purpose and scope, the issue 
of definition is at the forefront. The following sections of this Ar-
ticle explore an increasingly important component of the privilege: 
whether and how state reporter’s privilege protections cover stu-
dent journalists, concentrating on statutory, constitutional, and 
common-law sources. 
II. ARE STUDENT JOURNALISTS COVERED? 
Currently, forty states and the District of Columbia recognize a 
reporter’s privilege either in statutory form or in a functionally 
equivalent rule of evidence adopted by the state supreme court.84 
Nine of the other ten states have recognized the privilege through 
their common law or the state or federal constitution,85 leaving 
                                                                                                                            
83 Jason A. Martin & Anthony L. Fargo, Rebooting Shield Laws: Updating Journalist’s 
Privilege to Reflect the Realities of Digital Newsgathering, 24 U. FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 47, 
65–66 (2013). 
84 ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (2016); ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.300–09.25.390 (2016); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (2016); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-510 (2016); CAL. 
EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 2016); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-119 (2016); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 52-146t (2015); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320–4326 (2016); D.C. CODE §§ 16-
4701 to 16-4704 (2016); FLA. STAT. § 90.5015 (2016); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-5-508 (2016); 
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 5/8-901 to 5/8-909 (2016); IND. CODE §§ 34-46-4-1 to 34-46-4-2 
(2016); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-480 to 60-485 (2016); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 
(West 2016); LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1451–45:1459 (2016); ME. REV. tit. 16, § 61 (2016); 
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112 (LexisNexis 2016); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§ 767.5a (2016); MINN. STAT. §§ 595.021–595.025 (2016); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1-
901 to 26-1-903 (2015); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-144 to 20-147 (2016); NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 49.275 (2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21 to 2A:84A-21.13 (West 2016); N.Y. CIV. 
RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney 2016); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.11 (2016); N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 31-01-06.2 (2016); N.M. R. EVID. 11-514(B); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2739.04, 
2739.12 (LexisNexis 2016); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2506 (2016); OR. REV. STAT. 
§§ 44.510–44.540 (2015); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5942 (2016); 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-19.1-
1 to 9-19.1-3 (2016); S.C. CODE ANN § 19-11-100 (2016); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 
(2016); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 22.021–22.027 (West 2015); TEX. CODE 
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.11 (West 2015); UTAH R. EVID. 509(a); WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 5.68.010 (2016); W. VA. CODE § 57-3-10 (2016); WIS. STAT. § 885.14 (2016). 
85 In re Wright, 700 P.2d 40, 41 (Idaho 1985); Waterloo/Cedar Falls Courier v. 
Hawkeye Cmty. Coll., 646 N.W.2d 97, 101–03 (Iowa 2002); Sinnott v. Bos. Ret. Bd., 524 
N.E.2d 100, 586–87 (Mass. 1988); State ex. rel. Classic III Inc. v. Ely, 954 S.W.2d 650, 
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Wyoming as the lone state without any kind of reporter’s privi-
lege.86 As noted above, the privilege’s scope varies from one state 
to the next, as does the definition of a journalist.87 This Part re-
views relevant statutes, cases, and the common law, and concludes 
that the privilege usually does not extend to student journalists—
either because students do not qualify for the protections, or the 
qualifying criteria are so unclear that student journalists could not 
reasonably expect to satisfy them. 
A. Statutes and Cases Interpreting Statutes 
To determine whether state shield statutes and rules protect 
student journalists, the authors grouped the statutes and rules into 
ten categories, based on the scope of their coverage and how they 
define a journalist. The categories range from student journalists are 
explicitly covered, to covered person must be a professional journalist. 
Within each category, the statutes and rules are arranged chrono-
logically by the year each one was enacted. The authors interpreted 
the statutes and rules using a textualist approach, which “posits 
that once [a court] has ascertained a statute’s plain meaning, con-
sideration of legislative history becomes irrelevant.”88 
                                                                                                                            
655–56 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); State v. Siel, 444 A.2d 499, 502–03 (N.H. 1982); Hopewell 
v. Midcontinent Broad. Corp., 538 N.W.2d 780, 782 (S.D. 1995); State v. St. Peter, 315 
A.2d 254, 256 (Vt. 1974); Brown v. Commonwealth, 204 S.E.2d 429, 431 (Va. 1974); 
Shield Laws, 11 STUDENT PRESS L. CTR., no. 3, 1990, at 28, 29 (citng two court decisions 
in Mississippi that recognized a reporter’s qualified privilege). 
86 Reporter’s Privilege Guide: Rhode Island – Wyoming, STUDENT PRESS L. CTR. (Dec. 5, 
2014, 5:57 PM), http://www.splc.org/article/2014/12/reporters-privilege-guide-4 
[https://perma.cc/S2GC-US9U]. 
87 Id. 
88 William N. Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623 (1990) 
(exploring the rise of textualism through the ascension of Justice Scalia to the Supreme 
Court). As Professior Eskridge commented, there is an “analytic condundrum” at the 
heart of any court’s statutory interpretation: 
The statute’s text is the most important consideration in statutory 
interpretation, and a clear text ought to be given effect. Yet the 
meaning of a text critically depends upon its surrounding context. 
Sometimes that context will suggest a meaning at war with the 
apparent contextual meaning suggested by the statute’s language. 
How should the judge proceed? Is contextual evidence even 
admissible in such cases? How can it be excluded? 
Id. at 621. 
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The late Justice Antonin Scalia was perhaps the Supreme 
Court’s most ardent defender of the textualist approach.89 In his 
view, if a statute’s meaning was clear, it would be a derogation of 
the court’s duty to consult legislative history or other texts to in-
terpret the statute.90 In that sense, Scalia’s textualism was part and 
parcel of the balance of powers: Congress should not dictate judi-
cial review with directive legislative history, and courts should not 
impose un-enacted but preferred policy outcomes contained in lan-
guage from legislative history with the intent or effect of undermin-
ing legislative will.91 
Judge Frank Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit, in contrast, at-
tempted to clarify his own philosophy on statutory interpretation in 
an article in which he quoted another circuit judge, who stated: 
“The enemy is not legislative records—it is bad legislative 
records.”92 Although he admitted that he is a “notorious opponent 
of legislative history,”93 Judge Easterbrook rejected the “plain 
meaning” notion of statutory interpretation, arguing that “[i]n in-
teresting cases, meaning is not ‘plain’; it must be imputed; and the 
choice among meanings must have a footing more solid than a dic-
tionary.”94 So, the traditional textual approach that relies on out-
side sources, such as dictionaries, is not the mode of interpretation 
that Judge Easterbrook would embrace. 
Meanwhile, Justice Samuel Alito follows a modified textualist 
approach that allows for discussions of context: The text is su-
preme, but legislative history can be consulted to establish the con-
                                                                                                                            
89 Id. at 623. 
90 Id. (“Although it is true that the Court in recent times has expressed approval of this 
doctrine [that legislative history can sometimes trump plain meaning], that is to my mind 
an ill-advised deviation from the venerable principle that if the language of a statute is 
clear, that language must be given effect—at least in the absence of a patent absurdity.” 
(quoting Immigration and Naturalization Servs. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring))). 
91 Id. at 654. 
92 Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 61–62 (1994) (quoting Abner J. Mikva, Statutory 
Interpretation: Getting the Law to Be Less Common, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 979, 982 (1989)). 
93 Id. at 62. 
94 Id. at 67. 
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text in which the text should be read.95 One commentator, compar-
ing the textualist approaches of the justices on the bench, described 
Justice Scalia’s approach as “ambiguity-avoiding” and Justice Ali-
to’s approach as “ambiguity-seeking,” adding that the latter would 
consult legislative history if it would aid him in “seeing all possible 
interpretations and choosing the correct one.”96 On the other 
hand, Justice Scalia creatively interpreted the rules of grammar and 
statutory construction to eliminate the need to consult legislative 
history.97 Thus, with textualism on the rise,98 this Article follows 
Justice Scalia’s approach—hewing closely to the text and using 
rules of grammar and construction to illuminate it—to determine 
whether, and how, the shield statutes cover student journalists. 
1. Student Journalists Are Explicitly Covered 
Student journalists are explicitly covered in two state statutes: 
Maryland and West Virginia.99 The Maryland shield protects “any 
person who is, or has been . . . [e]nrolled as a student in an institu-
tion of postsecondary education and engaged in any news gathering 
or news disseminating capacity recognized by the institution as a 
scholastic activity.”100 This statute makes two important distinc-
tions. First, it covers students only at postsecondary institutions, 
excluding high school and middle school students.101 Second, the 
statute appears to distinguish student journalists, who often are 
affiliated with an independent student media outlet, and journalism 
students, who often write and report for a class.102 Counterintui-
                                                                                                                            
95 Elliott M. Davis, Note, The Newer Textualism: Justice Alito’s Statutory Interpretation, 
30 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 983, 984 (2007). 
96 Id. at 998. 
97 Id. 
98 See, e.g., John Calhoun, Measuring the Fortress: Explaining Trends in Supreme Court 
and Circuit Court Dictionary Use, 124 YALE L. J. 484, 507 (2014) (suggesting that, in an 
analysis of courts’ increasing uses starting in the 1980s of dictionary definitions in their 
opinions, “[o]ne possible explanation for the rise in Supreme Court dictionary usage is 
that both originalism and textualism gained major intellectual currency around the same 
time”). 
99 MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112 (LexisNexis 2016); W. VA. CODE § 57-3-
10 (2016). 
100 § 9-112(b)(3). 
101 See id. 
102 See id. 
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tively, a first-year journalism student who is subpoenaed in connec-
tion with a story posted on a class blog is likely to have an easier 
time claiming the privilege than a student journalist writing for an 
independent campus newspaper with a much larger circulation. 
In comparison, the West Virginia shield protects anyone who 
“regularly” produces “news . . . that concerns matters of public 
interest for dissemination to the public for a substantial portion of 
the person’s livelihood.”103 Protection extends to “a student re-
porter at an accredited educational institution who meets all of the 
requirements, except that his or her reporting may not provide a 
portion of his or her livelihood.”104 This raises several questions. 
For example, what about an “educational institution” that is not 
“accredited”? Presumably, its students are not covered. But ac-
creditation exists at different levels: universities are accredited, 
schools are accredited, and so on.105 Therefore, it is unclear wheth-
er a student journalist would be covered if, say, an unaccredited 
communications program housed the news organization where the 
student worked, but the university as a whole was accredited. 
Furthermore, the West Virginia statute is unclear on its protec-
tion for students whose reporting does “provide a portion of his or 
her livelihood.”106 Some are paid for their work, and some receive 
                                                                                                                            
103 § 57-3-10(a). 
104 Id. 
105 See generally Understanding Accreditation of U.S. Colleges and Universities, 
PETERSON’S (Oct. 7, 2015), https://www.petersons.com/college-search/us-colleges-
universities-accreditation.aspx#/sweeps-modal [https://perma.cc/W974-M8MQ] 
(“Accreditation is a form of endorsement that colleges and universities use to let 
potential students know that their program offers a valid education that is officially 
recognized by the U.S. Department of Education. Earning an accreditation in the United 
States is a voluntary, nongovernmental process. Schools request to be evaluated and/or 
have their programs evaluated by an independent accrediting agency. The agency sets its 
own standards that the school must meet in order to earn their accreditation, and since 
accrediting agencies vary in their quality standards, some are considered more prestigious 
than others. Accrediting agencies are private educational associations. The standards they 
set and which types of colleges and universities they accredit are entirely up to them, thus 
there are agencies that are specific to certain fields of study, such as engineering or 
medical schools . . . . Some schools can carry multiple accreditations which cover some or 
all of their programs.”). 
106 See § 57-3-10. 
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scholarships for it.107 The key is whether the word “may,” which 
has multiple meanings, is read to express possibility or to deny permis-
sion. If it is read to express possibility (“except that [it is possible for] 
his or her reporting . . . not [to] provide a portion of his or her live-
lihood”), the privilege would apply to money-earning student jour-
nalists. If it is read to deny permission (“except that his or her re-
porting [must] not provide a portion of his or her livelihood”), the 
privilege would not apply to money-earning student journalists un-
less they qualified as regular journalists under the other statutory 
provision—a tall order because of the “substantial” reference in 
that provision. At this time, there are no West Virginia cases ad-
dressing these issues. 
2. Noncommercial Educational Broadcasters Covered 
Explicitly 
One of Ohio’s two shield laws protects from compelled disclo-
sure any “person engaged in the work of, or connected with, or 
employed by any noncommercial educational or commercial radio 
broadcasting station, or any noncommercial educational or com-
mercial television broadcasting station” for the purpose of produc-
ing news.108 That is broad enough to apply to student journalists. 
And while that statute conspicuously omits newspapers,109 a sepa-
rate statute provides similar protections to individuals working 
with or for a newspaper.110 However, Ohio law does not clearly in-
clude school-affiliated papers in that statute, creating an open ques-
tion of whether they—and the people who work for them—are 
protected under the shield.111 No case law addresses these issues. 
                                                                                                                            
107 See, e.g., Scholarships, NEW ENG. NEWSPAPER & PRESS ASS’N., http:// 
www.nenpa.com/story/scholarships [https://perma.cc/EBE3-SR4G] (last visited Feb. 7, 
2017); Scholarships, RADIO TELEVISION DIGITAL NEWS FOUND., http:// 
rtdna.org/content/scholarships [https://perma.cc/3BF2-LZZN] (last visited Feb. 7, 
2017) (requiring work samples for eligibility for the scholarship). 
108 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.04 (LexisNexis 2016). 
109 See id. 
110 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.12 (LexisNexis 2016). 
111 See id. (“No person engaged in the work of, or connected with, or employed by any 
newspaper or any press association for the purpose of gathering, procuring, compiling, 
editing, disseminating, or publishing news shall be required to disclose . . . .”). 
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3. Covered Person/Entity Loosely Defined 
Four statutes cover a type of person and/or entity but do not 
provide clear definitions of them, leaving open the possibility for a 
student journalist to claim protection.112 First, the Alaska shield 
refers to a “reporter,”113 as does the Illinois statute.114 Meanwhile, 
the Maine shield refers to a “journalist,”115 and the Washington 
law covers “the news media.”116 These statutes—with the excep-
tion of Maine’s, which offers no definition of a journalist117—define 
their terms in relation to conducting business as a journalist, or be-
ing employed as one. Schools may treat student journalists as vo-
lunteers or enrolled students, rather than employees, so it is possi-
ble these statutes would not cover students. The outcome depends 
                                                                                                                            
112 See ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.300–09.25.390 (2016); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 5/8-901 
to 5/8-909 (2016); ME. REV. tit. 16, § 61 (2016); WASH. REV. CODE § 5.68.010 (2016). 
113 ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.300–09.25.390. A “reporter” is defined as “a person 
regularly engaged in the business of collecting or writing news for publication, or 
presentation to the public, through a news organization; it includes persons who were 
reporters at the time of the communication, though not at the time of the claim of 
privilege.” § 09.25.390(4). 
114 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/8-901. A “reporter” is defined as “any person regularly 
engaged in the business of collecting, writing or editing news for publication through a 
news medium on a full-time or part-time basis; and includes any person who was a 
reporter at the time the information sought was procured or obtained.” Id. § 5/8-902(a). 
115 ME. REV. STAT. tit. 16, § 61.1. 
116 WASH. REV. CODE. § 5.68.010(1). “News media” is defined as: 
(a) Any newspaper, magazine or other periodical, book publisher, 
news agency, wire service, radio or television station or network, 
cable or satellite station or network, or audio or audiovisual 
production company, or any entity that is in the regular business of 
news gathering and disseminating news or information to the public 
by any means, including, but not limited to, print, broadcast, 
photographic, mechanical, internet, or electronic distribution; 
(b) Any person who is or has been an employee, agent, or 
independent contractor of any entity listed in (a) of this subsection, 
who is or has been engaged in bona fide news gathering for such 
entity, and who obtained or prepared the news or information that is 
sought while serving in that capacity; or 
(c) Any parent, subsidiary, or affiliate of the entities listed in (a) or (b) 
of this subsection to the extent that the subpoena or other compulsory 
process seeks news or information described in subsection (1) of this 
section. 
§ 5.68.010(5). 
117 See ME. REV. STAT. tit. 16, § 61. 
786         FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVII:763 
 
on how the student media define their “business,” and manage 
their student “employees.” 
4. Person Is Engaged with or Connected to News Media, But 
Is Not Necessarily Employed 
This is the largest category of statutes, containing ten that de-
fine a covered person as someone engaged with, or connected to, 
the news media.118 Student journalists may be protected under 
these statutes. For example, Alabama’s applies to those “engaged 
in, connected with or employed” by a news organization,119 while 
California’s applies to a “publisher, editor, reporter, or other per-
son connected with or employed upon” a news outlet.120 Mean-
while, the Arkansas law covers “any editor, reporter, or other writ-
er for any newspaper, periodical, radio station, television station, or 
Internet news source.”121 The Kentucky shield, in contrast, pro-
tects any person who has obtained information for the purpose of 
publishing it “in a newspaper or [broadcasting it] by a radio or tele-
vision station by which he is engaged or employed, or with which 
he is connected.”122 Finally, Arizona’s law covers any person “en-
gaged in newspaper, radio, television or reportorial work, or con-
nected with or employed by” a news outlet.123 The remaining sta-
tutes in this group—those of Pennsylvania,124 Montana,125 Michi-
gan,126 Tennessee,127 and North Dakota128—all follow a similar pat-
tern. 
                                                                                                                            
118 ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (2016); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (2016); ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 16-85-510 (2016); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 2016); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 421.100 (West 2016); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 767.5a (2016); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1-
901 to 26-1-903 (2015); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (2016); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. 
§ 5942 (2016); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (2016). 
119 ALA. CODE. § 12-21-142. 
120 CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070; see also CAL CONST. art. 1, § 2 (b) (providing the same 
language as the statute). 
121 ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-510. 
122 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100. 
123 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237. 
124 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5942(a) (2016). 
125 MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-902(1) (2015). 
126 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 767.5a(1) (2016). 
127 TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208(a) (2016). 
128 N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (2016). 
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5. Covered Person Is Engaged in Producing News for the 
Public 
This category includes seven shields that may cover student 
journalists,129 although the case is not an easy one because of the 
inclusion of “the public” as the audience for a journalist’s work. 
For example, the Minnesota shield covers any person “directly en-
gaged” in the gathering or production of “information for . . . the 
purpose of dissemination to the public.”130 Similarly, the Nebraska 
shield covers “those who gather, write, or edit information for the 
public.”131 Oregon protects any “person connected with, employed 
by or engaged in any medium of communication to the public.”132 
And the Georgia shield covers “any person, company, or other ent-
ity engaged in the gathering and dissemination of news for the pub-
lic.”133 Again, the remaining laws—those of South Carolina,134 
Wisconsin,135 and Utah, which is a rule of evidence136—follow suit. 
The courts in these states have not interpreted “public” as it re-
lates to student journalists, so it remains to be seen how students 
would fare, based on the audiences for their work. 
6. Covered Person Must Produce News for the General Public 
These statutes go a step farther than those in the previous 
group by insisting that covered persons disseminate news to the 
general public.137 This would be a difficult bar for some student 
journalists to reach. The New Jersey shield, for example, covers 
any “person engaged on, engaged in, connected with, or employed 
by news media for the purpose of” disseminating news to the 
                                                                                                                            
129 See GA. CODE ANN. § 24-5-508 (2016); MINN. STAT. §§ 595.021–595.025 (2016); 
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-144 to 20-147 (2016); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 44.510–44.540 (2015); 
S.C. CODE ANN § 19-11-100 (2016); WIS. STAT. § 885.14 (2016). 
130 MINN. STAT. § 595.023. 
131 NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-144. 
132 OR. REV. STAT. § 44.520(1). 
133 GA. CODE ANN. § 24-5-508. 
134 S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-100(A). 
135 WIS. STAT. § 885.14(a) (2016). 
136 UTAH R. EVID. 509(a). 
137 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21 to 2A:84A-21.13 (West 2016); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 8-53.11 (2016). 
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“general public.”138 Although the Superior Court of New Jersey 
construed the law to apply to bloggers,139 the court tailored its anal-
ysis to whether a blogger qualified as a journalist, rather than inter-
preting the term “general public.”140 Similarly, the North Carolina 
shield protects various people connected with a “news medium,” 
defined as any “entity regularly engaged in the business of publica-
tion or distribution of news . . . to the general public.”141 It is diffi-
cult to imagine that a student journalist producing news for a pri-
marily high school audience would be seen as addressing the gener-
al public, but it is a closer call for student journalists producing 
news for a college or university campus, where in some places the 
campus and greater community are one and the same. With that in 
mind, high school journalists probably would not be covered, but 
some college journalists would be. 
7. Publication Frequency, Paying Readership, and 
Accreditation 
These statutes require some connection to a news organization 
and provide strict definitions of what constitutes a legitimate (i.e., 
covered) organization.142 Most student journalists would have 
trouble claiming to contribute to a news organization so defined. 
For example, the Indiana shield protects people “connected with” 
a newspaper or news periodical “issued at regular intervals and 
having a general circulation.”143 
Likewise, the Louisiana law applies to reporters “connected 
with any news media,” defined as “any newspaper or other period-
ical issued at regular intervals and having a paid general circula-
tion.”144 Some student media, especially at the high-school level, 
                                                                                                                            
138 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21. 
139 In re Jan. 11, 2013 Subpoena by Grand Jury of Union Cty., N.J., 75 A.3d 1260, 1271 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2013). 
140 Id. at 1272. 
141 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.11(a)(3). 
142 See IND. CODE §§ 34-46-4-1 to 34-46-4-2 (2016); LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1451–
45:1459 (2016); 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-19.1-1 to 9-19.1-3 (2016). 
143 IND. CODE § 34-46-4-1(1). 
144 LA. STAT. ANN. § 45:1451. A Louisiana appellate court found that a weekly 
newspaper owner and editor qualified as a reporter, despite the owner’s claims that he 
“was not acting as a ‘reporter.’” Becnel v. Lucia, 420 So. 2d 1173, 1175 (La. Ct. App. 
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do not publish at regular intervals; and most student media, at all 
levels, do not have a paid general circulation. Student journalists 
working for such media would not qualify for the privilege. 
The New Mexico shield, which is actually a rule of evidence, 
covers any “person engaged or employed by news media for the 
purpose of gathering, procuring, transmitting, compiling, editing, 
or disseminating news for the general public or on whose behalf 
news is so gathered, procured, transmitted, compiled, edited, or 
disseminated.”145 It includes exceptions for parties that can prove 
they need access to the withheld information.146 
And, finally, Rhode Island protects any “reporter . . . or other 
person directly engaged in the gathering or presentation of news for 
any accredited” news outlet.147 This, of course, raises the ques-
tions: What is an “accredited” news outlet, and does a student out-
let qualify? Legally, there is no such thing as an “accredited” out-
let, because that kind of scheme would constitute licensing in viola-
tion of the First Amendment.148 Legislators most likely used the 
word here to mean “good” or “professional.” 
8. Covered Person Must Earn Livelihood from News Work, 
Not Necessarily Employed by News Organization 
Texas is the lone member of this category. Its statutes are semi-
professionalized, insofar as they focus on money earned from jour-
nalistic work.149 The laws cover journalists who, “for a substantial 
                                                                                                                            
1982). The court said it did not matter what the defendant thought he was, but rather 
what the court believed his status to be. Id. 
145 N.M. R. EVID. 11-514(B). It is worth noting that the New Mexico legislature passed a 
journalist shield statute in 1973, but the New Mexico Supreme Court struck it down as 
applied to courts and judicial proceedings, finding it to be in violation of the New Mexico 
Constitution. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-7(A), invalidated by Ammerman v. Hubbard 
Broadcasting, Inc., 551 P.2d 1354 (N.M. 1976). 
146 N.M. R. EVID. 11-514(C). This makes the privilege more like a limited work-product 
protection, rather than an absolute privilege. 
147 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19.1-2 (2016). 
148 Lee, supra note 46, at 679 (“Lawyers, physicians, and psychotherapists are licensed. 
This means that no one without a license may lawfully offer services reserved for those 
professions. A hallmark of American free expression, however, is that every citizen may 
publish without seeking permission from the government.”). 
149 See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 22.021–22.027 (West 2015); TEX. CODE 
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.11 (West 2015). 
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portion of [their] livelihood or for substantial financial gain,” gath-
er and/or publish news and/or information.150 Presumably, the 
“gain” required must be more than potential gain in the future 
(e.g., gainful employment as a result of the skills developed by 
working or interning with the news organization). A student could 
argue that she earns a modest livelihood from her work as a journal-
ist. But, overall, it is unclear how a court would evaluate a stu-
dent’s financial situation, especially if the student was still a de-
pendent, either legally or practically.151 No court has addressed 
these issues. 
9. Covered Person Must Be Employed by the News Media 
This category is interesting because of its focus on actual em-
ployment, not just a connection with a news organization.152 Neva-
da’s shield covers any “editorial employee of any newspaper, pe-
riodical or press association or employee of any radio or television 
station.”153 Oklahoma’s law protects “any individual employed 
by” a “news service” that gathers and publishes news.154 Similarly, 
the District of Columbia shield covers anyone “employed by the 
news media in a news gathering or news disseminating capacity.”155 
Finally, the Connecticut statute protects “any person who is or has 
been an employee, agent or independent contractor of any” news 
outlet.156 The remaining shield laws in this group—those of Dela-
ware,157 Colorado,158 and Kansas159—follow a similar pattern. 
                                                                                                                            
150 See § 22.021(2); art. 38.11 § 1(2). 
151 Would the gain be relative to what she earns herself, or what she earns plus what she 
receives from her parents? 
152 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-119 (2016); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-146t (2015); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320–4326 (2016); D.C. CODE §§ 16-4701 to 16-4704 (2016); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 60-480 to 60-485 (2016); NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.275 (2015); OKLA. STAT. 
tit. 12, § 2506 (2016). 
153 NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.275. 
154 OKLA. STAT. tit. 12 § 2506(A)(7). 
155 D.C. CODE § 16-4702. 
156 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-146t(a)(2). 
157 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 4320(4). 
158 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-119(1) (2016). 
159 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-480(a) (2016). 
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These shields are notable because employment can mean many 
things, including part-time or otherwise irregular, non-standard 
employment relationships. For example, consider a student jour-
nalist who is under contract as an employee to produce one story 
per year for a student newspaper in exchange for $10. That person 
would satisfy the requirements of many statutes in this category. 
However, if that same student produced ten stories per week for a 
student newspaper as part of an academic course, she may 
not satisfy the requirements. 
10. Covered Person Must Be a Professional Journalist and 
Meet Other Requirements 
The final category includes two statutes that require journalists 
to be “professional” and to satisfy other criteria.160 The New York 
shield covers “a professional journalist” who, “for gain or livelih-
ood, is engaged in” gathering and publishing news for an organiza-
tion that “has as one of its regular functions” the “dissemination 
[of news] to the public; [and] such person [must do so] either as a 
regular employee or as one otherwise professionally affiliated for 
gain or livelihood.”161 Similarly, the Florida shield applies to a 
“professional journalist,” defined as a “person regularly engaged 
in” both gathering and publishing news, “for gain or livelihood, 
who obtained the information sought while working as a salaried 
employee of, or independent contractor for,” a news organiza-
tion.162 Courts may find the key word in “student journalist” to be 
student, and thus distinguish students and professionals, leaving the 
former without protections.163 
                                                                                                                            
160 See FLA. STAT. § 90.5015 (2016); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney 2016). 
161 N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (a)(6). 
162 FLA. STAT. § 90.5015(1)(a). 
163 See, e.g., Blum v. Schlegel, 150 F.R.D. 42, 44 (W.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting that if New 
York’s shield law governed the question of whether a law student reporter qualified for 
the privilege, the plaintiff’s argument that the privilege does not apply to the student may 
be correct). 
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B. Constitutional and Common-Law Protections 
1. State Level 
In all but one of the states lacking a shield statute—and even in 
a few states that have one—it is possible to claim a reporter’s privi-
lege through the common law or the federal or state constitutions. 
For example, the Supreme Court of Idaho has recognized a quali-
fied privilege based on the First Amendment and the state constitu-
tion, allowing a journalist to refuse to disclose confidential 
sources.164 However, no Idaho court has addressed whether the 
privilege covers student journalists, and the state does not have a 
statutory shield. 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Iowa has recognized a quali-
fied privilege under both the First Amendment and the state con-
stitution that “protects confidential sources, unpublished informa-
tion, and reporter’s notes.”165 The privilege covers anyone who 
“falls within the class of persons qualifying for the privilege,”166 as 
long as the information sought was obtained during the “newsga-
thering process.”167 Courts in the state, which lacks a statutory 
shield, have not defined the terms “class of persons” and “news-
gathering process,” though one trial court did extend the privilege 
to a freelance journalist.168 It is unclear how student journalists 
would be treated. 
Massachusetts also lacks a statutory shield, and so far its courts 
have declined to recognize one through the state constitution.169 
However, some courts have applied a First Amendment balancing 
                                                                                                                            
164 In re Wright, 700 P.2d 40, 41 (Idaho 1985) (“We hold there is [a newsperson’s 
qualified privilege to refuse to disclose confidential sources] under the First Amendment 
to the United States Constitution and Art. I, § 9 of the Idaho Constitution.”). 
165 Waterloo/Cedar Falls Courier v. Hawkeye Cmty. Coll., 646 N.W.2d 97, 101–03 
(Iowa 2002) (citing IOWA CONST. art. I, § 7; Lamberto v. Bown, 326 N.W.2d 305, 310 
(Iowa 1982); Winegard v. Oxberger, 258 N.W.2d 847, 852 (Iowa 1977), cert. denied, 436 
U.S. 905 (1978)). 
166 Id. at 101 (citing Lamberto, 326 N.W.2d at 309). 
167 Id. (citing Bell v. City of Des Moines, 412 N.W.2d 585, 588 (Iowa 1987)). 
168 Stanfield v. Polk Cty., No. CE 34-20125, 1990 BL 233, at *6 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Sept. 13, 
1990). 
169 See Commonwealth v. Corsetti, 438 N.E.2d 805, 808 (Mass. 1982); Ayash v. Dana-
Farber Cancer Inst., 706 N.E.2d 316, 319 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999). 
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test to that end,170 and the state’s highest court once used a quali-
fied common-law privilege to protect confidential sources in a civil 
lawsuit.171 The courts have not addressed whether those privileges 
apply to student journalists, though, and they have not fully ad-
dressed who qualifies to claim them. 
Meanwhile, Mississippi, which lacks a shield statute, has rec-
ognized a privilege against compelled disclose of confidential in-
formation and sources, based on the First Amendment and the 
state constitution.172 However, like Massachusetts, there are no 
reported cases involving student journalists, and Mississippi courts 
have not clearly articulated who qualifies to claim the privilege. 
In Missouri, which does not have a statutory shield, the Court 
of Appeals has recognized a qualified First Amendment privilege 
against the compelled disclosure of confidential sources.173 But, 
again, no cases have involved student journalists. Both Vermont174 
and Virginia175 lack statutory shields, too, and base their privileges 
on the First Amendment. They have not been applied judicially to 
student journalists. 
New Hampshire is notable because, even though it lacks a sta-
tutory shield, its highest court once affirmed a ruling that two stu-
                                                                                                                            
170 Sinnott v. Bos. Ret. Bd., 524 N.E.2d 100, 586–87 (Mass. 1988); In re Promulgation of 
Rules Regarding Prot. of Confidential News Sources, 479 N.E.2d 154, 158 (Mass. 1985) 
(“This court has also noted that the method of case-by-case adjudication involves a 
balancing between the public interest in every person’s evidence and the public interest in 
protecting the free flow of information.” (citing Commonwealth, 438 N.E.2d at 809)); In re 
Roche, 411 N.E.2d 466, 476–77 (Mass. 1980). 
171 Sinnott, 524 N.E.2d at 583–84, 586. 
172 Shield Laws, supra note 85. 
173 State ex. rel. Classic III Inc. v. Ely, 954 S.W.2d 650, 655–56 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997). 
174 State v. St. Peter, 315 A.2d 254, 256 (Vt. 1974) (“We hold that, when a 
newsgatherer, legitimately entitled to First Amendment protection, objects to inquiries 
put to him in a deposition proceeding conducted in a criminal case, on the grounds of a 
First Amendment privilege, he is entitled to refuse to answer unless the interrogator can 
demonstrate to the judicial officer appealed to that there is no other adequately available 
source for the information and that it is relevant and material on the issue of guilt or 
innocence.”). 
175 Brown v. Commonwealth, 204 S.E.2d 429, 431 (Va. 1974) (“We believe that, as a 
news-gathering mechanism, a newsman’s privilege of confidentiality of information and 
identity of his source is an important catalyst to the free flow of information guaranteed 
by the freedom of press clause of the First Amendment . . . . [W]e think the privilege of 
confidentiality should yield only when the defendant’s need is essential to a fair trial.”). 
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dent journalists for a college newspaper could claim a qualified pri-
vilege against disclosing the identity of confidential sources in a 
criminal proceeding.176 The court failed to note explicitly that the 
reporters worked for a student publication, but it based its decision 
on the state constitution’s guarantee of freedom of the press.177 It is 
likely, then, that at least college journalists could claim the 
shield.178 
In contrast, South Dakota lacks a statutory shield, and there is 
only one instance in which a court recognized a privilege to protect 
confidential information in a civil case.179 Adopting a qualified pri-
vilege over an absolute one, the Supreme Court of South Dakota 
noted that there are certain circumstances in which “disclosure 
may be appropriate or necessary.”180 Although the court adopted 
five factors for trial courts to consider in their determination of 
whether to compel disclosure,181 the court made little-to-no effort 
in defining who qualifies for the privilege.182 That is still better, 
however, than the situation in Wyoming, where there is neither a 
statutory shield183 nor a reported case in which a court has recog-
nized the privilege on any basis. 
2. Federal Level 
It is worth noting that there are federal cases involving student 
journalists that could enable other people similarly situated to 
claim a privilege in those jurisdictions, despite the lack of a federal 
statute. These cases could be used as persuasive authority, even in 
state courts. For example, in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., the 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recognized a reporter’s pri-
vilege for a former freelance journalist who enrolled in the Univer-
sity of California, Los Angeles, film department, where he investi-
                                                                                                                            
176 State v. Siel, 444 A.2d 499, 502–03 (N.H. 1982). 
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
179 Hopewell v. Midcontinent Broad. Corp., 538 N.W.2d 780, 782 (S.D. 1995). 
180 Id. at 781–82. 
181 Id. at 782. The court adopted a five-factor test from a case decided by the Supreme 
Court of California. See id. (citing Mitchell v. Superior Court, 690 P.2d 625, 632 (Cal. 
1984)). 
182 Id. 
183 Reporter’s Privilege Guide: Rhode Island – Wyoming, supra note 86. 
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gated the death of activist Karen Silkwood for a documentary.184 
The company accused of causing Silwood’s death subpoenaed the 
student journalist to compel him to produce his notes related to the 
investigation.185 
After considering whether the privilege extended to someone 
who is not a “regular newsman,” the court applied a First 
Amendment-based privilege, concluding that the student under-
took investigative reporting for the preparation of a documentary 
film.186 The court recognized that, though the student was not a 
salaried reporter, he had a legitimate interest in protecting the 
fruits of his labor.187 The court also noted the irony of the compa-
ny’s argument that the student should be denied the privilege be-
cause he lacked journalistic qualifications, in the face of the great 
efforts the company expended to obtain his work product.188 
Additionally, the District Court for the Western District of 
New York granted a qualified privilege to a law student writing for 
a law school newspaper on a volunteer basis who was subpoenaed 
by a former law professor challenging his termination.189 In Blum v. 
Schlegel, the terminated professor sought the recording of an inter-
view that the student had conducted with the associate dean.190 
Though New York has a shield law,191 the court ruled that the evi-
dence sought was relevant to federal constitutional violations al-
leged in the professor’s complaint, and thus the privilege would be 
governed instead by federal common law.192 Considering the plain-
tiff’s argument that the privilege does not apply to a law student 
because he does not qualify as a “professional journalist,” the 
court stated that this point is irrelevant because the federal privi-
                                                                                                                            
184 Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 435–37 (10th Cir. 1977). 
185 Id. at 434. 
186 Id. at 436–37. 
187 Id. at 437. 
188 Id. at 436–37. 
189 Blum v. Schlegel, 150 F.R.D. 42, 43–44 (W.D.N.Y. 1993). 
190 Id. 
191 See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney 2016). 
192 Blum, 150 F.R.D. at 44. 
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lege is broader than the state shield law.193 Instead, the proper in-
quiry is “how the person asserting the privilege intended to use the 
information gathered.”194 If the information was gathered for the 
purpose of dissemination, the court said, the privilege should be 
available.195 
In another federal case in New York, Persky v. Yeshiva Universi-
ty, the Southern District applied a First Amendment-based privi-
lege to a student journalist who reported on a university em-
ployee’s claim that the institution had discriminated against her on 
the basis of religion.196 The plaintiff tried to compel the student 
journalist to reveal her confidential sources and notes,197 but the 
court applied the privilege to the student based on the Second Cir-
cuit’s von Bulow opinion and the Western District of New York’s 
Blum opinion.198 The court said the student journalist promised his 
sources confidentiality and gathered all of the relevant information 
with the intent to disseminate it.199 Thus, he could claim the privi-
lege.200 
On the opposite coast, in Jimenez v. City of Chicago, the District 
Court for Western District of Washington allowed a journalism 
graduate student at Northwestern University201 to claim the privi-
lege.202 During the trial of a boy who was convicted of murder at 
thirteen (and later sentenced to forty-five years in prison),203 the 
                                                                                                                            
193 Id. at 44–45. The New York shield law’s definition of a professional journalist 
requires the person to engage in news gathering or preparation for “gain or livelihood.” 
§ 79-h; see also supra Section II.A.10. 
194 Blum, 150 F.R.D. at 45. 
195 Id. 
196 Persky v. Yeshiva Univ., No. 01-CV-5287, 2002 WL 31769704, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002). 
197 Id. at *2. 
198 Id. (citing von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 1987); Blum v. 
Schlegel, 150 F.R.D. 42, 45 (W.D.N.Y. 1993)). 
199 Id. 
200 Id. 
201 The school is now called the Medill School of Journalism, Media, Integrated 
Marketing Communications. See Wendy Leopold, Medill Expands Name, NW. (Mar. 15, 
2011), http://www.northwestern.edu/newscenter/stories/2011/03/medill-name-
expansion.html [https://perma.cc/2YSS-LWHQ]. 
202 Jimenez v. City of Chicago, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1270–72 (W.D. Wash. 2010). 
203 Id. at 1270. 
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journalism student, Carolyn Nielsen, gathered documents related 
to the case and published a story about the proceeding in a journal-
ism school magazine.204 After graduation, Nielsen worked as a free-
lancer, and then became a journalism professor at Western Wash-
ington University.205 Years later, in 2009, the boy’s conviction was 
reversed, and he filed a lawsuit against the City of Chicago and 
others.206 As part of the lawsuit, the plaintiff subpoenaed Nielsen’s 
correspondence with him and a videotape of a deposition.207 When 
Nielsen claimed a reporter’s privilege, the court, citing Shoen, said 
that a First Amendment privilege was available, so long as the per-
son claiming it gathered the materials at issue with the intent to 
disseminate them.208 The court explicitly noted that other circuits 
had extended the privilege to students, ultimately concluding that 
Nielson was eligible for the privilege.209 
III. LACK OF PROTECTION IS CONCERNING 
Most state reporter’s privileges exclude student journalists or 
make it difficult for such students to claim shield protections.210 
Only two statutes explicitly reference students,211 and many shields 
include non-student-friendly language, such as requiring the jour-
nalistic work to be done for “substantial financial gain,”212 or only 
covering a “professional journalist.”213 Other definitions are so 
ambiguous that it is difficult to say whether they would include 
student journalists. For example, would a student journalist be 
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205 Id. 
206 Id. 
207 Id. 
208 Id. at 1271 (citing Shoen v. Shoen, 48 F.3d 412, 416 (9th Cir. 1995); Shoen v. Shoen, 
5 F.3d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1993)). 
209 Id. at 1271–72 (citing Silkwood v. Kerr–McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977); 
Blum v. Schlegel, 150 F.R.D. 42 (W.D.N.Y. 1993)) (“Given that other circuits have not 
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210 See supra Section II.A. 
211 See supra Section II.A.1. 
212 See supra Section II.A.8. 
213 See supra Section II.A.10. 
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“engaged in” or “connected with” a news outlet if she wrote for a 
student paper?214 Would that outlet be considered “accredited”?215 
And, if the newspaper published only four issues each year, would 
those intervals be sufficiently “regular”?216 
Moreover, the case law is sparse.217 Only a few jurisdictions 
have reported cases involving privilege claims by student journal-
ists.218 Beyond that, just a small minority of jurisdictions have re-
ported cases addressing privilege issues at all, and those decisions 
generally fail to address how student journalists would fare in fu-
ture cases.219 In short, privilege protections for student journalists 
are, at best, uncertain in most states. 
The lack of protection is concerning because, as noted above, 
student journalists play a vital role in meeting their communities’ 
needs for news and information.220 In four states, student journal-
ists outnumber professional journalists who report on state legisla-
tures.221 More generally, fulfilling news needs means candidly cov-
ering a range of public issues that might draw government res-
ponses—even subpoenas.222 At the college level alone, campus-
based news organizations—and student collaborations with profes-
sional outlets—are filling some of the gaps created by the decline of 
traditional state and local media.223 Such organizations cover the 
states and towns where the schools are located.224 For example, 
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Arizona State University operates Cronkite News, where students 
cover public affairs in Phoenix, Arizona, Washington, D.C., and 
Los Angeles, California,225 and Boston University runs the New 
England Center for Investigative Reporting, where professional 
journalists work with students to produce major stories.226 
For years, too, there has been a growing consensus that journal-
ism programs should transform themselves into “teaching hospit-
als” for gathering, producing, and distributing news.227 For exam-
ple, in a 2009 report, the Knight Commission on the Information 
Needs of Communities in a Democracy228 asserted that colleges 
needed to enhance their roles as “hubs of journalistic activity.”229 
And, in a 2012 open letter to university presidents, leaders of the 
nation’s largest journalism foundations stated that journalism pro-
grams must “recreate themselves if they are to succeed in playing 
their vital roles as news creators.”230 
                                                                                                                            
225 About Us, CRONKITE NEWS, https://cronkitenews.azpbs.org/about-us/ [https:// 
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228 The purpose of the Knight Commission—a panel composed of media, policy, and 
community leaders—was to “assess the information needs of communities, and 
recommend measures to help Americans better meet those needs.” The Knight 
Commission on the Information Needs of Communities in a Democracy, ASPEN INST., https:// 
www.aspeninstitute.org/programs/communications-and-society-program/the-knight-
commission-on-information-needs-of-communities-in-a-democracy/ [https://perma.cc/ 
8R48-3RNN] (last visited Apr. 2, 2017). 
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While student journalists make significant contributions 
through independent reporting, they lack important legal protec-
tions. Recently, one student journalist was incarcerated for months 
after refusing to reveal a source.231 The lack of protections for stu-
dent journalists is plainly irreconcilable with watchdog journalism, 
which is essential for informed communities.232 Thus, protecting 
these journalists from disruptions in their classes, lives, and futures 
is in the best interest of both professional journalists, who will need 
to hire principled graduates in the future, and the public, which 
needs good reporters for the free exchange of information. Law-
makers and judges should apply the privileges to student journalists 
through legislative amendments and judicial recognitions to allow 
student journalists, where warranted, to make promises of confi-
dentiality with confidence. 
CONCLUSION 
Reporter’s privileges are as varied in application as they are 
controversial in theory. While commentators, jurists, and legisla-
tors struggle to agree on the appropriate limitations and interpreta-
tions of the privilege, student journalists are often neglected or out-
right excluded. The majority of states offer some protection to 
journalists, but most have crafted their laws or interpreted them—
intentionally or not—to exclude the growing and ever-important 
population of student journalists. While more research is needed to 
deduce the best solution to protect student journalists, it is clear 
that they are vulnerable and in need of greater legal clarity to per-
form confidently their increasingly important roles. 
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